Related papers: Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
We consider a social choice problem where only a small number of people out of a large population are sufficiently available or motivated to vote. A common solution to increase participation is to allow voters use a proxy, that is, transfer…
Purpose: Multiwinner voting rules typically require full knowledge of voter preferences, which becomes impractical in large-scale or attention-limited settings. This paper investigates how accurately a winning committee can be approximated…
Let $G = (A \cup B,E)$ be a bipartite graph where the set $A$ consists of agents or main players and the set $B$ consists of jobs or secondary players. Every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors. A matching $M$ is popular if for any…
When selecting committees based on preferences of voters, a variety of different criteria can be considered. Two natural objectives are maximizing the utilitarian welfare (the sum of voters' utilities) and coverage (the number of…
Platforms for online civic participation rely heavily on methods for condensing thousands of comments into a relevant handful, based on whether participants agree or disagree with them. These methods should guarantee fair representation of…
We study the {PAC} learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval ballots, where each voter approves some of the…
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G=(A U B, E), where each vertex in A U B specifies a strict…
For a voting ensemble that selects an odd-sized subset of the ensemble classifiers at random for each example, applies them to the example, and returns the majority vote, we show that any number of voters may minimize the error rate over an…
Consider an election between k candidates in which each voter votes randomly (but not necessarily independently) and suppose that there is a single candidate that every voter prefers (in the sense that each voter is more likely to vote for…
Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social…
We consider the notions of agreement, diversity, and polarization in ordinal elections (that is, in elections where voters rank the candidates). While (computational) social choice offers good measures of agreement between the voters, such…
In the committee selection problem, the goal is to choose a subset of size $k$ from a set of candidates $C$ that collectively gives the best representation to a set of voters. We consider this problem in Euclidean $d$-space where each…
We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…
We study popularity for matchings under preferences. This solution concept captures matchings that do not lose against any other matching in a majority vote by the agents. A popular matching is said to be robust if it is popular among…
We consider elections where the voters come one at a time, in a streaming fashion, and devise space-efficient algorithms which identify an approximate winning committee with respect to common multiwinner proportional representation voting…
When selecting a subset of candidates (a so-called committee) based on the preferences of voters, proportional representation is often a major desideratum. When going beyond simplistic models such as party-list or district-based elections,…
Popularity is an approach in mechanism design to find fair structures in a graph, based on the votes of the nodes. Popular matchings are the relaxation of stable matchings: given a graph G=(V,E) with strict preferences on the neighbors of…
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a collective ranking. A distinctive feature of our setting is that agents are matched to alternatives. Applications include rankings of colleges or academic…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
Citizen-focused democratic processes where participants deliberate on alternatives and then vote to make the final decision are increasingly popular today. While the computational social choice literature has extensively investigated voting…