Related papers: Complexity of Judgment Aggregation
Reaching some form of consensus is often necessary for autonomous agents that want to coordinate their actions or otherwise engage in joint activities. One way to reach a consensus is by aggregating individual information, such as…
Judgment aggregation problems form a class of collective decision-making problems represented in an abstract way, subsuming some well known problems such as voting. A collective decision can be reached in many ways, but a direct one-step…
We study the computational complexity of several scenarios of strategic behavior for the Kemeny procedure in the setting of judgment aggregation. In particular, we investigate (1) manipulation, where an individual aims to achieve a better…
Judgment aggregation is a framework to aggregate individual opinions on multiple, logically connected issues into a collective outcome. These opinions are cast by judges, which can be for example referees, experts, advisors or jurors,…
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations,…
Given a set of conflicting arguments, there can exist multiple plausible opinions about which arguments should be accepted, rejected, or deemed undecided. We study the problem of how multiple such judgments can be aggregated. We define the…
One of the better studied properties for operators in judgment aggregation is independence, which essentially dictates that the collective judgment on one issue should not depend on the individual judgments given on some other issue(s) in…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
In this paper we analyze judgement aggregation problems in which a group of agents independently votes on a set of complex propositions that has some interdependency constraint between them(e.g., transitivity when describing preferences).…
An important problem in computational social choice theory is the complexity of undesirable behavior among agents, such as control, manipulation, and bribery in election systems. These kinds of voting strategies are often tempting at the…
It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery.…
Egalitarian considerations play a central role in many areas of social choice theory. Applications of egalitarian principles range from ensuring everyone gets an equal share of a cake when deciding how to divide it, to guaranteeing balance…
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…
Many important collective decision-making problems can be seen as multi-agent versions of discrete optimisation problems. Participatory budgeting, for instance, is the collective version of the knapsack problem; other examples include…
Like many other voting systems, Majority Judgement suffers from the weaknesses of the underlying mathematical model: Elections as problem of choice or ranking. We show how the model can be enhanced to take into account the complete process…
An important problem in decision theory concerns the aggregation of individual rankings/ratings into a collective evaluation. We illustrate a new aggregation method in the context of the 2007 MSOM's student paper competition. The…
In most real-world settings, due to limited time or other resources, an agent cannot perform all potentially useful deliberation and information gathering actions. This leads to the metareasoning problem of selecting such actions.…
We study a class of {\em aggregation rules} that could be applied to ethical AI decision-making. These rules yield the decisions to be made by automated systems based on the information of profiles of preferences over possible choices. We…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…