Related papers: Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria and Robust B…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

We propose Monte Carlo Permutation Search (MCPS), a general-purpose Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm that improves upon the GRAVE algorithm. MCPS is relevant when deep reinforcement learning is not an option or when the computing…

We present Doubly Robust Monte Carlo Tree Search (DR-MCTS), a novel algorithm that integrates Doubly Robust (DR) off-policy estimation into Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to enhance sample efficiency and decision quality in complex…

Consider a two-player zero-sum stochastic game where the transition function can be embedded in a given feature space. We propose a two-player Q-learning algorithm for approximating the Nash equilibrium strategy via sampling. The algorithm…

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of algorithms for effectively solving imperfect-information games. To enhance CFR's applicability in large games, researchers use neural networks to approximate its behavior. However,…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

Dynamic resource allocation (DRA) problems are an important class of dynamic stochastic optimization problems that arise in a variety of important real-world applications. DRA problems are notoriously difficult to solve to optimality since…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method presented in [4] to…

In noncooperative Nash games, equilibria are often inefficient. This is exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma and was first provably shown in the 1980s. Since then, understanding the quality of Nash equilibrium (NE) received considerable…

We explore the use of policy approximations to reduce the computational cost of learning Nash equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games. We propose a new Q-learning type algorithm that uses a sequence of entropy-regularized soft policies to…

A simple and natural algorithm for reinforcement learning (RL) is Monte Carlo Exploring Starts (MCES), where the Q-function is estimated by averaging the Monte Carlo returns, and the policy is improved by choosing actions that maximize the…

We introduce Mean-Field Trust Region Policy Optimization (MF-TRPO), a novel algorithm designed to compute approximate Nash equilibria for ergodic Mean-Field Games (MFG) in finite state-action spaces. Building on the well-established…

The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…

Model-based reinforcement learning (RL), which finds an optimal policy using an empirical model, has long been recognized as one of the corner stones of RL. It is especially suitable for multi-agent RL (MARL), as it naturally decouples the…

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in game theory,…

We consider the problem of computing mixed Nash equilibria of two-player zero-sum games with continuous sets of pure strategies and with first-order access to the payoff function. This problem arises for example in game-theory-inspired…

In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…

In an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon by changing his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to compute epsilon-Nash equilibria, and for what values of epsilon a polynomial-time algorithm…