Related papers: Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Hetero…
Equitable allocation of indivisible items involves partitioning the items among agents such that everyone derives (almost) equal utility. We consider the approximate notion of \textit{equitability up to one item} (EQ1) and focus on the…
This paper studies the problem of distributed Riemannian optimization over a network of agents whose cost functions are geodesically smooth but possibly geodesically non-convex. Extending a well-known distributed optimization strategy…
In this paper, a distributed subgradient-based algorithm is proposed for continuous-time multi-agent systems to search a feasible solution to convex inequalities. The algorithm involves each agent achieving a state constrained by its own…
In this paper, the distributed resource allocation optimization problem is investigated. The allocation decisions are made to minimize the sum of all the agents' local objective functions while satisfying both the global network resource…
We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling identical…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
We consider convex and nonconvex constrained optimization with a partially separable objective function: agents minimize the sum of local objective functions, each of which is known only by the associated agent and depends on the variables…
We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents with additional conflict constraints. These are represented by a conflict graph where each item corresponds to a vertex of the graph and edges in the graph represent…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
In this paper, we present an approach for solving the problem of moving $N$ homogeneous agents into $M \geq N$ goal locations along energy-minimizing trajectories. We propose a decentralized framework that only requires knowledge of the…
This paper re-examines the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive bivalued valuations. Garg and Murhekar (2021) proposed a polynomial-time algorithm that purported to find an EFX and fPO…
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of…
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget…
Fair division has emerged as a very hot topic in multiagent systems, and envy-freeness is among the most compelling fairness concepts. An allocation of indivisible items to agents is envy-free if no agent prefers the bundle of any other…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problems where the ambiguity set is defined using the Wasserstein metric. We show that this class of DRO problems can be reformulated as semi-infinite programs. We give an exchange method…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…