Related papers: Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Hetero…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
In this paper, we develop a class of decentralized algorithms for solving a convex resource allocation problem in a network of $n$ agents, where the agent objectives are decoupled while the resource constraints are coupled. The agents…
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that…
In this paper, we consider fair assignment of complex requests for Mobility-On-Demand systems. We model the transportation requests as temporal logic formulas that must be satisfied by a fleet of vehicles. We require that the assignment of…
We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…
We explore solutions for fairly allocating indivisible items among agents assigned weights representing their entitlements. Our fairness goal is weighted-envy-freeness (WEF), where each agent deems their allocated portion relative to their…
We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources…
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a…
We study fair division of divisible goods under generalized assignment constraints. Here, each good has an agent-specific value and size, and every agent has a budget constraint that limits the total size of the goods she can receive. Since…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…
This paper proposes distributed algorithms to solve robust convex optimization (RCO) when the constraints are affected by nonlinear uncertainty. We adopt a scenario approach by randomly sampling the uncertainty set. To facilitate the…
We provide a framework for the assignment of multiple robots to goal locations, when robot travel times are uncertain. Our premise is that time is the most valuable asset in the system. Hence, we make use of redundant robots to counter the…
We present distributed algorithms that can be used by multiple agents to align their estimates with a particular value over a network with time-varying connectivity. Our framework is general in that this value can represent a consensus…
The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bound the query complexity of computing an envy-free outcome in…