Related papers: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games
In a weighted majority voting game, the players' weights are determined based on the constitutional planner's intentions. The weights are challenging to change in numerous cases, as they represent some desired disparity. However, the voting…
The Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices were first introduced to measure the power of voters in a weighted voting system. Given a weighted voting system, the fixed point of such a system is found by continually reassigning each voter's…
In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This…
Power indices are essential in assessing the contribution and influence of individual agents in multi-agent systems, providing crucial insights into collaborative dynamics and decision-making processes. While invaluable, traditional…
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…
Decisions in a shareholder meeting or a legislative committee are often modeled as a weighted game. Influence of a member is then measured by a power index. A large variety of different indices has been introduced in the literature. This…
This paper is a twofold contribution. First, it contributes to the problem of enumerating some classes of simple games and in particular provides the number of weighted games with minimum and the number of weighted games for the dual class…
We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of weight of the $k$-th…
For $f$ a weighted voting scheme used by $n$ voters to choose between two candidates, the $n$ \emph{Shapley-Shubik Indices} (or {\em Shapley values}) of $f$ provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome…
This paper employs switching-algebraic techniques for the calculation of a fundamental index of voting powers, namely, the total Banzhaf power. This calculation involves two distinct operations: (a) Boolean differencing or differentiation,…
In this paper new algorithm for calculating power indices is described. The complexity class of the problem is #P-complete and even calculating power index of the biggest player is NP-hard task. Constructed algorithm is a mix of ideas of…
We introduce a new simple game, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short). C-WMMG models a basic cooperation rule, the complementary cooperation rule, and can be taken as a sister model of…
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple votes in a committee decide between three options by…
We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms…
This paper addresses Monte Carlo algorithms for calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index in weighted majority games. First, we analyze a naive Monte Carlo algorithm and discuss the required number of samples. We then propose an efficient…
In social network analysis, there is a common perception that influence is relevant to determine the global behavior of the society and thus it can be used to enforce cooperation by targeting an adequate initial set of individuals or to…
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calculate these power indices are based on counting winning…
We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this…
A number of recent works [Goldberg 2006; O'Donnell and Servedio 2011; De, Diakonikolas, and Servedio 2017; De, Diakonikolas, Feldman, and Servedio 2014] have considered the problem of approximately reconstructing an unknown weighted voting…
The International Monetary Fund is one of the largest international organizations using a weighted voting system. The weights of its 188 members are determined by a fixed amount of basic votes plus some extra votes for so-called Special…