Related papers: Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
In wireless packet-forwarding networks with selfish nodes, application of a repeated game can induce the nodes to forward each others' packets, so that the network performance can be improved. However, the nodes on the boundary of such…
Teamwork is vital in many settings, and it is socially beneficial for teams to cooperate in some situations (``good games'') and not in others (``bad games;'' e.g., those that allow for corruption). A team's cooperation in any given game…
We consider the problem of collaborative inference in a sensor network with heterogeneous and statistically dependent sensor observations. Each sensor aims to maximize its inference performance by forming a coalition with other sensors and…
We explore a broad class of values for cooperative games in characteristic function form, known as \emph{compromise values\/}. These values efficiently allocate payoffs by linearly combining well-specified upper and lower bounds on payoffs.…
In networked communications nodes choose among available actions and benefit from exchanging information through edges, while continuous technological progress fosters system functionings that increasingly often rely on cooperation. Growing…
In cooperative game theory, the social configurations of players are modeled by balanced collections. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem, perhaps the most fundamental theorem in cooperative game theory, characterizes the existence of solutions…
This paper proposes a new approach to power in Game Theory. Cooperation and conflict are simulated with a mechanism of payoff alteration, called F-game. Using convex combinations of preferences, an F-game can measure players' attitude to…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
This work focuses on the credit assignment problem in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Sharing the global advantage among agents often leads to insufficient policy optimization, as it fails to capture the coalitional…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
The success of modern civilization is built upon widespread cooperation in human society, deciphering the mechanisms behind has being a major goal for centuries. A crucial fact is, however, largely missing in most prior studies that games…
An analysis of several important aspects of competition or conflict in games, social choice and decision theory is presented. Inherent difficulties and complexities in cooperation are highlighted. These have over the years led to a certain…
This article explores the coalitional stability of a new cooperative control policy for freeways and parallel queuing facilities with multiple servers. Based on predicted future delays per queue or lane, a VOT-heterogeneous population of…
Cooperative 2-matching games are a generalization of cooperative matching games, where the value function is given by maximum-weight b-matchings, for a vertex capacity vector $b \leq 2$. We show how to separate over the core of 2-matching…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In two recent papers, Li and Ju argued that generally, concurrent game models, models of Coalition Logic, have three too strong assumptions: seriality,…
As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…
The research on coalitional games has focused on how to share the reward among a coalition such that players are incentivised to collaborate together. It assumes that the (deterministic or stochastic) characteristic function is known in…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…