Related papers: Non-Transferable Utility Coalitional Games via Mix…
Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…
The introduction of new services, such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), requires a massive investment that cannot be assumed by a single stakeholder, for instance the Infrastructure Provider (InP). Service Providers (SPs) however also have…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
We present a partial operator-theoretic characterization of approachability principle and based on this characterization, we interpret a particular distributed payoff allocation algorithm to be a sequence of time-varying paracontractions.…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
In this paper, we introduce past-aware game-theoretic centrality, a class of centrality measures that captures the collaborative contribution of nodes in a network, accounting for both uncertain and certain collaborators. A general…
This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
In this work, using a game-theoretic approach, cost-sensitive mechanisms that lead to reliable Internet-based computing are designed. In particular, we consider Internet-based master-worker computations, where a master processor assigns,…
We analyze the overall benefits of an energy community cooperative game under which distributed energy resources (DER) are shared behind a regulated distribution utility meter under a general net energy metering (NEM) tariff. Two community…
Game theory is a powerful analytical tool for modeling decision makers strategies, behaviors and interactions. Act and decisions of a decision maker can benefit or negatively impact other decision makers interests. Game theory has been…
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction…
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the…
We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…
This paper extends the theory of subset team games, a generalization of cooperative game theory requiring a payoff function that is defined for all subsets of players. This subset utility is used to define both altruistic and selfish…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…