Related papers: Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Ta…
This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented unless…
People who design, use, and are affected by autonomous artificially intelligent agents want to be able to \emph{trust} such agents -- that is, to know that these agents will perform correctly, to understand the reasoning behind their…
Existing approaches to coalition formation often assume that requirements associated with tasks are precisely specified by the human operator. However, prior work has demonstrated that humans, while extremely adept at solving complex…
This paper proposes a novel integrated dynamic method based on Behavior Trees for planning and allocating tasks in mixed human robot teams, suitable for manufacturing environments. The Behavior Tree formulation allows encoding a single job…
We propose a new formulation for the multi-robot task allocation problem that incorporates (a) complex precedence relationships between tasks, (b) efficient intra-task coordination, and (c) cooperation through the formation of robot…
In AI-assisted decision-making, it is critical for human decision-makers to know when to trust AI and when to trust themselves. However, prior studies calibrated human trust only based on AI confidence indicating AI's correctness likelihood…
This work addresses the problem of multi-robot coordination under unknown robot transition models, ensuring that tasks specified by Time Window Temporal Logic are satisfied with user-defined probability thresholds. We present a bi-level…
We set up a supply-side game-theoretic model for the cooperative production of virtual products. In our model, a group of producers collaboratively produce a virtual product by contributing costly input resources to a production coalition.…
A principal continually decides whether to approve resource allocations to an agent, who exerts private effort to remain eligible. The principal must perform costly inspections to determine the agent's eligibility. We characterize Markov…
This paper introduces a model of multi-unit organizations with either static structures, i.e., they are designed top-down following classical approaches to organizational design, or dynamic structures, i.e., the structures emerge over time…
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
As artificial agents become increasingly capable, what internal structure is *necessary* for an agent to act competently under uncertainty? Classical results show that optimal control can be *implemented* using belief states or world…
Multiagent systems can use commitments as the core of a general coordination infrastructure, supporting both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions. Agents whose objectives are aligned, and where one agent can help another achieve…
The family of Groves mechanisms, which includes the well-known VCG mechanism (also known as the Clarke mechanism), is a family of efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Unfortunately, the Groves mechanisms are generally not budget…
A major, ongoing social transition is the inclusion of autonomous agents into human organizations. For example, in defence and security applications, robots may be used alongside human operatives to reduce risk or add capability. But a key…
Many governmental bodies are adopting AI policies for decision-making. In particular, Reinforcement Learning has been used to design policies that citizens would be expected to follow if implemented. Much RL work assumes that citizens…
Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer agents, collaboration is most effective between individuals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strategy for collective action. However, in general a rational actor will only…
In human-robot teams where agents collaborate together, there needs to be a clear allocation of tasks to agents. Task allocation can aid in achieving the presumed benefits of human-robot teams, such as improved team performance. Many task…
We propose a decentralized game-theoretic framework for dynamic task allocation problems for multi-agent systems. In our problem formulation, the agents' utilities depend on both the rewards and the costs associated with the successful…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…