Related papers: Hidden Attacks on Power Grid: Optimal Attack Strat…
Data attacks on meter measurements in the power grid can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a new data attack model where an adversary produces changes in state estimation despite failing bad-data detection checks. The…
Meter measurements in the power grid are susceptible to manipulation by adversaries, that can lead to errors in state estimation. This paper presents a general framework to study attacks on state estimation by adversaries capable of…
In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…
The normal operation of power system relies on accurate state estimation that faithfully reflects the physical aspects of the electrical power grids. However, recent research shows that carefully synthesized false-data injection attacks can…
Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain the power system operating in a secure and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current security…
Sensors such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) endowed with GPS receivers are ubiquitously installed providing real-time grid visibility. A number of PMUs can cooperatively enable state estimation routines. However, GPS spoofing attacks…
New methods that exploit sparse structures arising in smart grid networks are proposed for the state estimation problem when data injection attacks are present. First, construction strategies for unobservable sparse data injection attacks…
A new mechanism aimed at misleading a power system control center about the source of a data attack is proposed. As a man-in-the-middle state attack, a data framing attack is proposed to exploit the bad data detection and identification…
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) can be effectively utilized for the monitoring and control of the power grid. As the cyber-world becomes increasingly embedded into power grids, the risks of this inevitable evolution become serious. In this…
The advent of smart power grid which plays a vital role in the upcoming smart city era is accompanied with the implementation of a monitoring tool, called state estimation. For the case of the unbalanced residential distribution grid, the…
The operation of power grids is becoming increasingly data-centric. While the abundance of data could improve the efficiency of the system, it poses major reliability challenges. In particular, state estimation aims to learn the behavior of…
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…
The vulnerability of false data injection attacks on real-time electricity pricing for the power grid market has been recently explored. Previous work has focused on the impact caused by attackers that compromise pricing signals and send…
The resilience of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for electric power networks for certain cyber-attacks is considered. We analyze the vulnerability of the measurement system to false data attack on communicated…
In this paper we develop a set of algorithms that can detect the identities of malicious data-manipulators in distributed optimization loops for estimating oscillation modes in large power system models. The estimation is posed in terms of…
Data attacks on state estimation modify part of system measurements such that the tempered measurements cause incorrect system state estimates. Attack techniques proposed in the literature often require detailed knowledge of system…
The Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) is an important metering device for smart grid. Like any other Intelligent Electronic Device (IED), PMUs are prone to various types of cyberattacks. However, one form of attack is unique to the PMU, the…
We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…
Security becomes an extremely important issue in smart grid. To maintain the steady operation for smart power grid, massive measurement devices must be allocated widely among the power grid. Previous studies are focused on false data…
Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack…