Related papers: Clearing Markets via Bundles
This paper explores the design of a balanced data-sharing marketplace for entities with heterogeneous datasets and machine learning models that they seek to refine using data from other agents. The goal of the marketplace is to encourage…
Differentiable economics -- the use of deep learning for auction design -- has driven progress in the automated design of multi-item auctions with additive or unit-demand valuations. However, little progress has been made for optimal…
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this…
Most of existing clustering algorithms are proposed without considering the selection bias in data. In many real applications, however, one cannot guarantee the data is unbiased. Selection bias might bring the unexpected correlation between…
We present a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (MLCA). The main goal of integrating machine learning (ML) into the auction is to improve preference elicitation, which is a major challenge in large combinatorial…
This thesis develops equilibrium asset pricing models in incomplete markets with a large number of heterogeneous agents using mean field game theory. The market equilibrium is characterized by a novel form of mean field backward stochastic…
There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then…
Budgets play a significant role in real-world sequential auction markets such as those implemented by internet companies. To maximize the value provided to auction participants, spending is smoothed across auctions so budgets are used for…
The demand response provides an opportunity for load serving entities (LSEs) that operate retail electricity markets (REMs) to strategically purchase energy and provide reserves in wholesale electricity markets (WEMs). This paper concerns…
A number of goods are called identical if they provide the same level of utility to each agent. In various real-world instances of fair division scenarios, identical indivisible items are allocated to consumers and demandants with different…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
We introduce a continuous analogue of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, which we name CLWE. We give a polynomial-time quantum reduction from worst-case lattice problems to CLWE, showing that CLWE enjoys similar hardness guarantees to…
Cluster-Weighted Modeling (CWM) is a flexible mixture approach for modeling the joint probability of data coming from a heterogeneous population as a weighted sum of the products of marginal distributions and conditional distributions. In…
We propose a new model for aggregating preferences over a set of indivisible items based on a quantile value. In this model, each agent is endowed with a specific quantile, and the value of a given bundle is defined by the corresponding…
The rise of algorithmic pricing in online retail platforms has attracted significant interest in how autonomous software agents interact under competition. This article explores the potential emergence of algorithmic collusion -…
This paper introduces a non-variational quantum algorithm designed to solve a wide range of combinatorial optimisation problems, including constrained and non-binary problems. The algorithm leverages an engineered interference process…
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE…
We study the equilibrium computation problem in the Fisher market model with constrained piecewise linear concave (PLC) utilities. This general class captures many well-studied special cases, including markets with PLC utilities, markets…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
Pari-mutuel markets are trading platforms through which the common market maker simultaneously clears multiple contingent claims markets. This market has several distinctive properties that began attracting the attention of the financial…