Related papers: Value of information in noncooperative games
We consider misinformation games, i.e., multi-agent interactions where the players are misinformed with regards to the game that they play, essentially having an \emph{incorrect} understanding of the game setting, without being aware of…
We show that, in large population games, decentralized information aggregation generically corrects for individual-level biases. This establishes a new testable aggregate efficiency benchmark where the behavior of boundedly rational agents…
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire…
We propose definitions of substitutes and complements for pieces of information ("signals") in the context of a decision or optimization problem, with game-theoretic and algorithmic applications. In a game-theoretic context, substitutes…
Deciding whether a model provides a good description of data is often based on a goodness-of-fit criterion summarized by a p-value. Although there is considerable confusion concerning the meaning of p-values, leading to their misuse, they…
In a function that takes its inputs from various players, the effect of a player measures the variation he can cause in the expectation of that function. In this paper we prove a tight upper bound on the number of players with large effect,…
We study how a monopolist's use of consumer data for price discrimination affects welfare. To answer this question, we develop a model of market segmentation subject to residual uncertainty. We fully characterize when data usage…
Mean-payoff games play a central role in quantitative synthesis and verification. In a single-dimensional game a weight is assigned to every transition and the objective of the protagonist is to assure a non-negative limit-average weight.…
We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value) may not exist in…
Semivalue-based data valuation uses cooperative-game theory intuitions to assign each data point a value reflecting its contribution to a downstream task. Still, those values depend on the practitioner's choice of utility, raising the…
How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…
When players make sequential decisions that are unobservable to one another, their behavior can nonetheless be influenced by knowing who moves first. This sequential structure, often referred to as "virtual observability," suggests that…
A game-theoretic model for the study of dynamic networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by communication networks that are subject to failure of nodes and where the restoration needs resources. The corresponding two-player game is…
Standard decision frameworks address uncertainty about facts but assume fixed options and values. We extend the Jeffrey-Bolker framework to model refinements in values and prove a value-of-information theorem for axiological refinement. In…
We study the weighted Myerson value for Network games extending a similar concept for communication situations. Network games, unlike communication situations, treat direct and indirect links among players differently and distinguish their…
The problem of efficient sharing of a resource is nearly ubiquitous. Except for pure public goods, each agent's use creates a negative externality; often the negative externality is so strong that efficient sharing is impossible in the…
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…
In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…
This paper develops computable metrics to assign priorities for information collection on network systems made up by binary components. Components are worth inspecting because their condition state is uncertain and the system functioning…
Competitive online games use rating systems for matchmaking; progression-based algorithms that estimate the skill level of players with interpretable ratings in terms of the outcome of the games they played. However, the overall experience…