Related papers: Guiding a General-Purpose C Verifier to Prove Cryp…

Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…

This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…

Ensuring the correct functionality of systems software, given its safety-critical and low-level nature, is a primary focus in formal verification research and applications. Despite advances in verification tooling, conventional programmers…

A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…

CHERI-C extends the C programming language by adding hardware capabilities, ensuring a certain degree of memory safety while remaining efficient. Capabilities can also be employed for higher-level security measures, such as software…

We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) for developing and checking complete proofs of security for cryptographic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose framework that is capable of modeling and…

Security protocols are essential building blocks of modern IT systems. Subtle flaws in their design or implementation may compromise the security of entire systems. It is, thus, important to prove the absence of such flaws through formal…

Cryptographic Protocols (CP) are distributed algorithms intended for secure communication in an insecure environment. They are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, systems of confidential data processing,…

We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…

Although Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) has seen considerable development in recent years, its use is challenging, resulting in complex code which obscures whether the security properties or correctness guarantees hold in practice. For…

Cryptographic protocols are hard to design and prove correct, as witnessed by the ever-growing list of attacks even on protocol standards. Symbolic models of cryptography enable automated formal security proofs of such protocols against an…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…

Confidential computing is a key technology for isolating high-assurance applications from the large amounts of untrusted code typical in modern systems. Existing confidential computing systems cannot be certified for use in critical…

Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in…

Formal verification of complex algorithms is challenging. Verifying their implementations goes beyond the state of the art of current automatic verification tools and usually involves intricate mathematical theorems. Certifying algorithms…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

We propose to analyse quantum protocols by applying formal verification techniques developed in classical computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. One area of successful application of these techniques is that of…

This article describes the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler back-end from Cminor (a simple imperative intermediate language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for…

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…