Related papers: Attacks on Fixed Apparatus Quantum Key Distributio…
We consider quantum key distribution in the device-independent scenario, i.e., where the legitimate parties do not know (or trust) the exact specification of their apparatus. We show how secure key distribution can be realized against the…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no…
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security…
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks…
Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible…
We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to…
Quantum key distribution promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can…
The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions may be invalid in practice due…
By testing nonlocality, the security of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) can be enhanced to being 'device-independent'. Here we ask whether such a strong form of security could also be established for one-way (prepare and…
Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of…
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the…
In recent years, several hacking attacks have broken the security of quantum cryptography implementations by exploiting the presence of losses and the ability of the eavesdropper to tune detection efficiencies. We present a simple attack of…
We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of…
We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and…
Device-independent quantum cryptographic schemes aim to guarantee security to users based only on the output statistics of any components used, and without the need to verify their internal functionality. Since this would protect users…
Security of quantum key distribution against sophisticated attacks is among the most important issues in quantum information theory. In this work we prove security against a very important class of attacks called collective attacks (under a…
We present a complete protocol for BB84 quantum key distribution for a realistic setting (noise, loss, multi-photon signals of the source) that covers many of todays experimental implementations. The security of this protocol is shown…
Recently proposed quantum key distribution protocols are shown to be vulnerable to a classic man-in-the-middle attack using entangled pairs created by Eve. It appears that the attack could be applied to any protocol that relies on…