Related papers: Conditional Expectations of Correspondences
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…
We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
Evolutionary game theory is an abstract and simple, but very powerful way to model evolutionary dynamics. Even complex biological phenomena can sometimes be abstracted to simple two-player games. But often, the interaction between several…
We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…
Coherent sets of desirable gamble sets is used as a model for representing an agents opinions and choice preferences under uncertainty. In this paper we provide some results about the axioms required for coherence and the natural extension…
We introduce the use of conservation laws to develop strategies in multi-player consensus games. First, basic well posedness results provide a reliable analytic setting. Then, a general non anticipative strategy is proposed through its…
A communication game consists of distributed parties attempting to jointly complete a task with restricted communication. Such games are useful tools for studying limitations of physical theories. A theory exhibits preparation contextuality…
Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…
Variational inequalities (VIs) encompass many fundamental problems in diverse areas ranging from engineering to economics and machine learning. However, their considerable expressivity comes at the cost of computational intractability. In…
Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…
We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity,…
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players $n$. Our main result states that for $n$-player binary-action games and for constant $\varepsilon$, the query complexity of an…
Any nonempty, compact, semi-algebraic set in [0, 1] n is the projection of the set of mixed equilibria of a finite game with 2 actions per player on its first n coordinates. A similar result follows for sets of equilibrium payoffs. The…
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…
Coherent sets of almost desirable gambles and credal sets are known to be equivalent models. That is, there exists a bijection between the two collections of sets preserving the usual operations, e.g. conditioning. Such a correspondence is…
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some…
The paper studies one-shot two-player games with non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty. Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set of…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…