Related papers: Private Matchings and Allocations
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is allowed, that is, each good may be allocated to up to $k$ agents, while incurring a cost for sharing. While classic maximin share (MMS) allocations may not…
Consider the following problem: given a metric space, some of whose points are "clients", open a set of at most $k$ facilities to minimize the average distance from the clients to these facilities. This is just the well-studied $k$-median…
The hybrid-model (Avent et al 2017) in Differential Privacy is a an augmentation of the local-model where in addition to N local-agents we are assisted by one special agent who is in fact a curator holding the sensitive details of n…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
Differentially Private algorithms often need to select the best amongst many candidate options. Classical works on this selection problem require that the candidates' goodness, measured as a real-valued score function, does not change by…
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…
We consider the problem of property testing for differential privacy: with black-box access to a purportedly private algorithm, can we verify its privacy guarantees? In particular, we show that any privacy guarantee that can be efficiently…
In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money…
We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…
Differential privacy is a robust privacy standard that has been successfully applied to a range of data analysis tasks. Despite much recent work, optimal strategies for answering a collection of correlated queries are not known. We study…
Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
We study classic fair-division problems in a partial information setting. This paper respectively addresses fair division of rent, cake, and indivisible goods among agents with cardinal preferences. We will show that, for all of these…
We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not…
In this paper, we consider the $k$-approximate pattern matching problem under differential privacy, where the goal is to report or count all substrings of a given string $S$ which have a Hamming distance at most $k$ to a pattern $P$, or…
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is defined to be the maximum value that…
We consider a setting where goods are allocated to agents by way of an allocation platform (e.g., a matching platform). An ``allocation facilitator'' aims to increase the overall utility/social-good of the allocation by encouraging (some of…