Related papers: Game Theory with Translucent Players
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
Game theory is appropriate for studying cyber conflict because it allows for an intelligent and goal-driven adversary. Applications of game theory have led to a number of results regarding optimal attack and defense strategies. However, the…
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and determine the truth value of all relevant logical/mathematical…
Common knowledge/belief in rationality is the traditional standard assumption in analysing interaction among agents. This paper proposes a graph-based language for capturing significantly more complicated structures of higher-order beliefs…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…
Transparency and security are both central to Responsible AI, but they may conflict in adversarial settings. We investigate the strategic effect of transparency for agents through the lens of transferable adversarial example attacks. In…
This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…
We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…
In this paper, we study the notion of admissibility for randomised strategies in concurrent games. Intuitively, an admissible strategy is one where the player plays `as well as possible', because there is no other strategy that dominates…
Standard models of bounded rationality typically assume agents either possess accurate knowledge of the population's reasoning abilities (Cognitive Hierarchy) or hold dogmatic, degenerate beliefs (Level-$k$). We introduce the ``Connected…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…
In quantum game theory, one of the most intriguing and important questions is, "Is it possible to get quantum advantages without any modification of the classical game?" The answer to this question so far has largely been negative. So far,…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
Counterfactual fairness alleviates the discrimination between the model prediction toward an individual in the actual world (observational data) and that in counterfactual world (i.e., what if the individual belongs to other sensitive…
Classical game theory treats players as special---a description of a game contains a full, explicit enumeration of all players---even though in the real world, "players" are no more fundamentally special than rocks or clouds. It isn't…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work, we proposed a framework for representing and analyzing games with possibly unaware…