Related papers: Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
Agents' judgment depends on perception and previous knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception. So, if judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they have…
We study an extension of the voter model in which each agent is endowed with an innate preference for one of two states that we term as "truth" or "falsehood". Due to interactions with neighbors, an agent that innately prefers truth can be…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Acquiescence bias, i.e. the tendency of humans to agree with statements in surveys, independent of their actual beliefs, is well researched and documented. Since Large Language Models (LLMs) have been shown to be very influenceable by…
This work studies the problem of ad hoc teamwork in teams composed of agents with differing computational capabilities. We consider cooperative multi-player games in which each agent's policy is constrained by a private capability…
We study two-sided matching markets in which one side of the market (the players) does not have a priori knowledge about its preferences for the other side (the arms) and is required to learn its preferences from experience. Also, we assume…
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
Artificially intelligent agents deployed in the real-world will require the ability to reliably \textit{cooperate} with humans (as well as other, heterogeneous AI agents). To provide formal guarantees of successful cooperation, we must make…
Benchmarking the capabilities of AI systems, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Models, typically ignores the impact of uncertainty in the underlying ground truth answers from experts. This ambiguity is not just limited to…
Safety-trained language models routinely refuse requests for help circumventing rules. But not all rules deserve compliance. When users ask for help evading rules imposed by an illegitimate authority, rules that are deeply unjust or absurd…
We demonstrate termination of binary consensus under the model and conditions used by Fischer, Lynch, and Patterson (FLP) to prove impossibility of binary agreement - in complete asynchrony and a possible process crash - in two steps.…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We introduce extension-based proofs, a class of impossibility proofs that includes valency arguments. They are modelled as an interaction between a prover and a protocol. Using proofs based on combinatorial topology, it has been shown that…
We study the problem of computing correlated strategies to commit to in games with multiple leaders and followers. To the best of our knowledge, this problem is widely unexplored so far, as the majority of the works in the literature focus…
In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…
We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a prediction model. In the absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested and rejected, regardless of whether or not data produces consensus among Bayesian agents. In…
This paper proposes a dual opinions co-evolution model based on the dual attitudes theory in social psychology, where every individual has dual opinions of an object: implicit and explicit opinions. The implicit opinions are individuals'…
Voting is a game with a no-go theorem. New proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem are given based on quantum information theory. We show that the Arrowian dictator is equivalent to the perfect cloning circuit. We present…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…