Related papers: Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely…
So far, the theory of equilibrium selection in the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is insensitive to communication possibilities. To address this issue, we incorporate the assumption that communication reduces -- but does not…
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…
We discuss conditionalisation for Accept-Desirability models in an abstract decision-making framework, where uncertain rewards live in a general linear space, and events are special projection operators on that linear space. This abstract…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
We formulate and prove an Agreement Theorem for quantum mechanics (QM), describing when two agents, represented by separate laboratories, can or cannot maintain differing probability estimates of a shared quantum property of interest.…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation. What happens if the players have incomplete information…
We study how open disagreement influences team performance in a dynamic production game. Team members can hold different priors about the productivity of the available production technologies. Initial beliefs are common knowledge and…
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…
This is an attempt to formalize the conditions of possibility for free, libre, open access to scientific knowledge within a game. The challenge is to enunciate the terms under which agents participating in the Grand conversation of science…
We propose a formal proof of the undecidability of the model checking problem for alternating- time temporal logic under imperfect information and perfect recall semantics. This problem was announced to be undecidable according to a…
The assumption that prediction-equivalent models produce equivalent explanations underlies many practices in explainable AI, including model selection, auditing, and regulatory evaluation. In this work, we show that this assumption does not…
We compare games under delayed control and delay games, two types of infinite games modelling asynchronicity in reactive synthesis. In games under delayed control both players suffer from partial informedness due to symmetrically delayed…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
Standard models of multi-agent modal logic do not capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and may be interpreted in different ways by different agents. We propose a framework that can model this, and consider different…
Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) propose the Off-Switch Game, a model of Human-AI cooperation in which AI agents always defer to humans because they are uncertain about our preferences. I explain two reasons why AI agents might not defer.…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Imitation is simple behavior which uses successful actions of others in order to deal with one's own problems. Because success of imitation generally depends on whether profit of an imitating agent coincides with those of other agents or…
Recent work by Faizal et al. (2025) claims that G\"odelian undecidability of non-algorithmic truths in our universe imply the impossibility of a formal, algorithmic simulation of the universe. This paper clarifies the distinction between…