Related papers: Learning Theory and Algorithms for Revenue Optimiz…

Online bidding is a classic optimization problem, with several applications in online decision-making, the design of interruptible systems, and the analysis of approximation algorithms. In this work, we study online bidding under…

Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…

Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that…

We study problems arising in real-time auction markets, common in e-commerce and computational advertising, where bidders face the problem of calculating optimal bids. We focus upon a contract management problem where a demand aggregator is…

Classical Bayesian mechanism design relies on the common prior assumption, but such prior is often not available in practice. We study the design of prior-independent mechanisms that relax this assumption: the seller is selling an…

The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated…

Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…

This paper discusses the revenue management (RM) problem to maximize revenue by pricing items or services. One challenge in this problem is that the demand distribution is unknown and varies over time in real applications such as airline…

We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used…

Real-Time Bidding is a new Internet advertising system that has become very popular in recent years. This system works like a global auction where advertisers bid to display their impressions in the publishers' ad slots. The most popular…

We examine two types of binary betting markets, whose primary goal is for profit (such as sports gambling) or to gain information (such as prediction markets). We articulate the interplay between belief and price-setting to analyse both…

We study reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show…

We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails…

Due to superstition, license plates with desirable combinations of characters are highly sought after in China, fetching prices that can reach into the millions in government-held auctions. Despite the high stakes involved, there has been…

We consider the problem of a firm seeking to use personalized pricing to sell an exogenously given stock of a product over a finite selling horizon to different consumer types. We assume that the type of an arriving consumer can be observed…

We present an algorithm for constructing an optimal slate of sponsored search advertisements which respects the ordering that is the outcome of a generalized second price auction, but which must also accommodate complicating factors such as…

We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces…

Auction is applied for trade with various mechanisms. A simple but practical question is which mechanism, typically first-price or second-price auctions, is preferred from the perspective of bidders or sellers. A celebrated answer is…

First-price auctions are one of the most popular mechanisms for selling goods and services, with applications ranging from display advertising to timber sales. Unlike their close cousin, the second-price auction, first-price auctions do not…

Most search engines sell slots to place advertisements on the search results page through keyword auctions. Advertisers offer bids for how much they are willing to pay when someone enters a search query, sees the search results, and then…