Related papers: Evolutionary games on the lattice: best-response d…
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce cooperative outcomes that would not be feasible in one-shot…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
We investigate a class of reinforcement learning dynamics where players adjust their strategies based on their actions' cumulative payoffs over time - specifically, by playing mixed strategies that maximize their expected cumulative payoff…
The study of evolutionary games with pairwise local interactions has been of interest to many different disciplines. Also local interactions with multiple opponents had been considered, although always for a fixed amount of players. In many…
We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update…
A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2 x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire…
In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
This paper deals with modeling of network's dynamic using evolutionary games approach. Today there are many different protocols for data transmission through the Internet, providing users with better or worse service. The process of…
In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations…
Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…
An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…
We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
Myopic best-response dynamics (MBRD) capture agents' bounded rationality and can generate evolutionary outcomes that differ from those produced by widely examined imitation dynamics. In this study, we apply MBRD to a three-strategy social…
This paper combines ideas from Q-learning and fictitious play to define three reinforcement learning procedures which converge to the set of stationary mixed Nash equilibria in identical interest discounted stochastic games. First, we…
This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-updating. Analytical conjectures using pair…
Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…