Related papers: Opinion Dynamic with agents immigration
We study a system in which N agents have to decide between two strategies \theta_i (i \in 1... N), for defection or cooperation, when interacting with other n agents (either spatial neighbors or randomly chosen ones). After each round, they…
An artificial neural network can be trained by uniformly broadcasting a reward signal to units that implement a REINFORCE learning rule. Though this presents a biologically plausible alternative to backpropagation in training a network, the…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
Cooperators forgo their interest to benefit others. Thus cooperation should not be favored by natural selection. It challenges the evolutionists, since cooperation is widespread. As one of the resolutions, information spreading has been…
Exploration of mechanisms underlying the emergence of collective cooperation remains a focal point in field of evolution of cooperation. Prevailing studies often neglect historical information, relying on the latest rewards as the primary…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
The Prisoner's Dilemma Process on a graph $G$ is an iterative process where each vertex, with a fixed strategy (cooperate or defect), plays the game with each of its neighbours. At the end of a round each vertex may change its strategy to…
We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model. It is found that the frequency of cooperators decreases with the increment of the…
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…
Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner's Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With…
In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of the human pro-social behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure "being watched" has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
Combined prosocial incentives, integrating reward for cooperators and punishment for defectors, are effective tools to promote cooperation among competing agents in population games. Existing research concentrated on how to adjust reward or…
In real-life complex systems, individuals often encounter multiple social dilemmas that cannot be effectively captured using a single-game model. Furthermore, the environment and limited resources both play a crucial role in shaping…
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on a class of weighted networks derived from Barab\'asi-Albert and random scale-free unweighted graphs. Using customary imitative dynamics, our…
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected…
We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…
In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all…