Related papers: Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit …
We introduce the notion of continuous invertibility on a compact set for volatility models driven by a Stochastic Recurrence Equation (SRE). We prove the strong consistency of the Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE) when the…
A fundamental problem in noncooperative dynamic game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria under different information structures, which specify the information available to each agent during decision-making. Prior work has…
Motivated by applications in job scheduling, queuing networks, and load balancing in cyber-physical systems, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic framework to balance the load among servers in static and dynamic settings. In these…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
This paper introduces state-robust equilibrium (SRE), a local validity test for Nash predictions in finite-strategy population games when the payoff-relevant aggregate state may be misspecified. The reported prescription and payoff map are…
We consider finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players' types evolve as conditionally independent Markov…
The so called \emph{quantum game theory} has recently been proclaimed as one of the new branches in the development of both quantum information theory and game theory. However, the notion of a quantum game itself has never been strictly…
We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium…
In this paper, we introduce a class of learning dynamics for general quantum games, that we call "follow the quantum regularized leader" (FTQL), in reference to the classical "follow the regularized leader" (FTRL) template for learning in…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
This study investigates the properties and stability of the Multiplicative Kantian Equilibrium (MKE) in symmetric games. We first demonstrate that MKE lacks strategic equivalence: the Kantian best-response function is not invariant under…
The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years…
In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash…
Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on $Z^d$, $d\ge 3$ when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix $\sigma^2I$. The…
We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b arXiv:1907.12408). The refinement…
We consider seeking a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a monotone game, played by dynamic agents which are modeled as a class of lower-triangular nonlinear uncertain dynamics with external disturbances. We establish a general framework that…
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in…
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) differential game over finite horizons. Under a fairly weak condition, the Stackelberg equilibrium is explicitly obtained by first solving a…
The Quasi Steady-State (QSS) model of long-term dynamics relies on the idea of time-scale decomposition. Assuming that the fast variables are infinitely fast and are stable in the long-term, the QSS model replaces the differential equations…