Related papers: Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit …
We present new learning dynamics combining (independent) log-linear learning and value iteration for stochastic games within the auxiliary stage game framework. The dynamics presented provably attain the efficient equilibrium (also known as…
In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
We present a new family of logit-Q dynamics for efficient learning in stochastic games by combining the log-linear learning (also known as logit dynamics) for the repeated play of normal-form games with Q-learning for unknown Markov…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…
Dynamic games offer a versatile framework for modeling the evolving interactions of strategic agents, whose steady-state behavior can be captured by the Nash equilibria of the games. Nash equilibria are often computed in feedback, with…
It is common to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that Nash equilibrium is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. In this…
We study the global convergence of policy optimization for finding the Nash equilibria (NE) in zero-sum linear quadratic (LQ) games. To this end, we first investigate the landscape of LQ games, viewing it as a nonconvex-nonconcave…
We consider dynamic games defined over an infinite horizon, characterized by linear, discrete-time dynamics and quadratic cost functionals. Considering such linear-quadratic (LQ) dynamic games, we focus on their solutions in terms Nash…
In the context of multi-player, general-sum games, there is an increasing interest in solution concepts modeling some form of communication among players, since they can lead to socially better outcomes with respect to Nash equilibria, and…
Quantum games with incomplete information can be studied within a Bayesian framework. We analyze games quantized within the EWL framework [Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein, Phys Rev. Lett. 83, 3077 (1999)]. We solve for the Nash equilibria…
Risk-aversion and bounded rationality are two key characteristics of human decision-making. Risk-averse quantal-response equilibrium (RQE) is a solution concept that incorporates these features, providing a more realistic depiction of human…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that…
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
This paper investigates the problem of computing the equilibrium of competitive games, which is often modeled as a constrained saddle-point optimization problem with probability simplex constraints. Despite recent efforts in understanding…
This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) equilibria of…
Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) design is one of the most classical optimal control problems, whose well-known solution is an input sequence expressed as a state-feedback. In this work, finite-horizon and discrete-time LQR is solved under…
The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibrium. Such a state corresponds to a strategy adopted by the…