Related papers: Designing Markets for Daily Deals
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…
Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous approaches that attempt to design revenue optimal auctions for the…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of bidding to auto-bidders. In this paper, we propose a family…
Diffusion auction design is a new trend in mechanism design for which the main goal is to incentivize existing buyers to invite new buyers, who are their neighbors on a social network, to join an auction even though they are competitors.…
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable constraints, giving only second-order consideration to the…
In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…
Prediction markets are powerful tools to elicit and aggregate beliefs from strategic agents. However, in current prediction markets, agents may exhaust the social welfare by competing to be the first to update the market. We initiate the…
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectrum allocation, and myriad financial markets. Analytic…
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such…
Driven by the new economic opportunities created by the creator economy, an increasing number of content creators rely on and compete for revenue generated from online content recommendation platforms. This burgeoning competition reshapes…
Sponsored search in E-commerce platforms such as Amazon, Taobao and Tmall provides sellers an effective way to reach potential buyers with most relevant purpose. In this paper, we study the auction mechanism optimization problem in…
Distributed energy resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar panels, are growing rapidly and are reshaping power systems. To promote DERs, feed-in-tariff (FIT) is usually adopted by utilities to pay DER owners certain fixed rates for…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
Most tourist destinations are facing regular and consistent seasonality with significant economic and social impacts. This phenomenon is more pronounced in the post-covid era, where demand for travel has increased but unevenly among…
In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, ClickWorker, CrowdFlower. In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to…
We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite…
Many online platforms today (such as Amazon, Netflix, Spotify, LinkedIn, and AirBnB) can be thought of as two-sided markets with producers and customers of goods and services. Traditionally, recommendation services in these platforms have…
This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…