Related papers: Approximation Algorithms for the Max-Buying Proble…
In the online (time-series) search problem, a player is presented with a sequence of prices which are revealed in an online manner. In the standard definition of the problem, for each revealed price, the player must decide irrevocably…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
In the (1-dimensional) bin packing problem, we are asked to pack all the given items into bins, each of capacity one, so that the number of non-empty bins is minimized. Zhu~[Chaos, Solitons \& Fractals 2016] proposed an approximation…
We provide a near-optimal, computationally efficient algorithm for the unit-demand pricing problem, where a seller wants to price n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values for the items are independently drawn…
We consider the problem of dynamic pricing with limited supply. A seller has $k$ identical items for sale and is facing $n$ potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each…
We propose a method for finding approximate solutions to multiple-choice knapsack problems. To this aim we transform the multiple-choice knapsack problem into a bi-objective optimization problem whose solution set contains solutions of the…
We consider the problem of designing auctions which maximize consumer surplus (i.e., the social welfare minus the payments charged to the buyers). In the consumer surplus maximization problem, a seller with a set of goods faces a set of…
A problem of minimization of delivery and storage costs of a product is considered under constraints on volumes of delivery from each of the suppliers. It is required to determine optimal volumes and times of product shipments. The problem…
We study a two-level uncapacitated lot-sizing problem with inventory bounds that occurs in a supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer. The first level with the demands is the retailer level and the second one is the supplier…
We present approximation algorithms for almost all variants of the multi-criteria traveling salesman problem (TSP). First, we devise randomized approximation algorithms for multi-criteria maximum traveling salesman problems (Max-TSP). For…
We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multi-item multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have additive valuations and are from the same population.…
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with $n$ agents and $m$ goods, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in…
This paper studies an open question in the warehouse problem where a merchant trading a commodity tries to find an optimal inventory-trading policy to decide on purchase and sale quantities during a fixed time horizon in order to maximize…
We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption - a classical problem in Multi-Dimensional Bayesian Mechanism Design. One of the biggest challenges in this area is developing…
Motivated by modern-day applications such as Attended Home Delivery and Preference-based Group Scheduling, where decision makers wish to steer a large number of customers toward choosing the exact same alternative, we introduce a novel…
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation $v$ for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some $S, T$, $v(S \cup T) < v(S) + v(T)$) and complements (i.e., for some $S,…
We discuss the problem of setting prices in an electronic market that has more than one buyer. We assume that there are self-interested sellers each selling a distinct item that has an associated cost. Each buyer has a submodular valuation…
Combinatorial Auctions are a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare, revenue, or profit). The…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an…