Related papers: On evolutionary games with periodic payoffs
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals…
Maintenance of cooperation was studied for a two-strategy evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are located on a one-dimensional chain and their payoff comes from games with the nearest and next-nearest neighbor…
One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…
In most studies regarding evolutionary game dynamics, the effective payoff, a quantity that translates the payoff derived from game interactions into reproductive success, is usually assumed to be a specific function of the payoff.…
We study a modified prisoner's dilemma game taking place on two-dimensional disordered square lattices. The players are pure strategists and can either cooperate or defect with their immediate neighbors. In the generations each player…
Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, is otherwise the standard stag-hunt dilemma (when individuals…
We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…