Related papers: Enabling Privacy-preserving Auctions in Big Data
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
Consider a pair of random variables $(X,Y)$ distributed according to a given joint distribution $p_{XY}$. A curator wishes to maximally disclose information about $Y$, while limiting the information leakage incurred on $X$. Adopting mutual…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
Auctions are a vital economic mechanism used to determine the market value of goods or services through competitive bidding within a specific framework. However, much of the current research primarily focuses on the bidding algorithms used…
We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to…
Advertisement auctions play a crucial role in revenue generation for e-commerce companies. To make the bidding procedure scalable to thousands of auctions, the automatic bidding (autobidding) algorithms are actively developed in the…
We study the design of prior-independent auctions in a setting with heterogeneous bidders. In particular, we consider the setting of selling to $n$ bidders whose values are drawn from $n$ independent but not necessarily identical…
Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security…
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but more than 40 years later a full analytical understanding of…
The need of totally secure online auction has led to the invention of many auction protocols. But as new attacks are developed, auction protocols also require corresponding strengthening. We analyze the auction protocol based on the…
A critical concern in data-driven processes is to build models whose outcomes do not discriminate against some demographic groups, including gender, ethnicity, or age. To ensure non-discrimination in learning tasks, knowledge of the group…
We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a…
Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…
We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms,…
In e-commerce advertising, the ad platform usually relies on auction mechanisms to optimize different performance metrics, such as user experience, advertiser utility, and platform revenue. However, most of the state-of-the-art auction…
We propose an adversarial learning framework that deals with the privacy-utility tradeoff problem under two types of conditions: data-type ignorant, and data-type aware. Under data-type aware conditions, the privacy mechanism provides a…
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…