Related papers: Proving soundness of combinatorial Vickrey auction…
We develop a classical propositional logic for reasoning about combinatory logic. We define its syntax, axiomatic system and semantics. The syntax and axiomatic system are presented based on classical propositional logic, with typed…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
The use of function contracts to specify the behavior of functions often remains limited to the scope of a single function call. Relational properties link several function calls together within a single specification. They can express more…
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…
We present a number of models for the adword auctions used for pricing advertising slots on search engines such as Google, Yahoo! etc. We begin with a general problem formulation which allows the privately known valuation per click to be a…
The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference sets that can appear for a dominant strategy incentive…
We study the design of truthful auctions for selling identical items in unlimited supply (e.g., digital goods) to n unit demand buyers. This classic problem stands out from profit-maximizing auction design literature as it requires no…
We present a machine learning-powered iterative combinatorial auction (MLCA). The main goal of integrating machine learning (ML) into the auction is to improve preference elicitation, which is a major challenge in large combinatorial…
We show that the multiplicative weight update method provides a simple recipe for designing and analyzing optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) auctions, and reduces the time complexity of the problem to pseudo-polynomial in…
Internet search results are a growing and highly profitable advertising platform. Search providers auction advertising slots to advertisers on their search result pages. Due to the high volume of searches and the users' low tolerance for…
Many sequential decision-making tasks require satisfaction of multiple, partially contradictory objectives. Existing approaches are monolithic, namely all objectives are fulfilled using a single policy, which is a function that selects a…
We study information design in click-through auctions, in which the bidders/advertisers bid for winning an opportunity to show their ads but only pay for realized clicks. The payment may or may not happen, and its probability is called the…
Advertisement auctions play a crucial role in revenue generation for e-commerce companies. To make the bidding procedure scalable to thousands of auctions, the automatic bidding (autobidding) algorithms are actively developed in the…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
We give a calculus for reasoning about the first-order fragment of classical logic that is adequate for giving the truth conditions of intuitionistic Kripke frames, and outline a proof-theoretic soundness and completeness proof, which we…
The paper is a contribution both to the theoretical foundations and to the actual construction of efficient automatizable proof procedures for non-classical logics. We focus here on the case of finite-valued logics, and exhibit: (i) a…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To…
We study blockchain trade-intent auctions, which currently intermediate about USD 10 billion in trades each month. These auctions are combinatorial because executing multiple trade intents jointly generates additional efficiencies. However,…
We study auction design when a seller relies on machine-learning predictions of bidders' valuations that may be unreliable. Motivated by modern ML systems that are often accurate but occasionally fail in a way that is essentially…