Related papers: Pricing Ad Slots with Consecutive Multi-unit Deman…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
In a sponsored search auction, decisions about how to rank ads impose tradeoffs between objectives such as revenue and welfare. In this paper, we examine how these tradeoffs should be made. We begin by arguing that the most natural solution…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to…
In this paper we study a continuous time stochastic inventory model for a commodity traded in the spot market and whose supply purchase is affected by price and demand uncertainty. A firm aims at meeting a random demand of the commodity at…
Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to determine how to place bids on the keywords of their interest in order to maximize their return for a given budget: this…
Online advertisements are a primary revenue source for e-commerce platforms. Traditional advertising models are store-centric, selecting winning stores through auction mechanisms. Recently, a new approach known as joint advertising has…
Online advertising platforms are thriving due to the customizable audiences they offer advertisers. However, recent studies show that advertisements can be discriminatory with respect to the gender or race of the audience that sees the ad,…
In the envy-free perfect matching problem, $n$ items with unit supply are available to be sold to $n$ buyers with unit demand. The objective is to find allocation and prices such that both seller's revenue and buyers' surpluses are…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
The ad-trading desks of media-buying agencies are increasingly relying on complex algorithms for purchasing advertising inventory. In particular, Real-Time Bidding (RTB) algorithms respond to many auctions -- usually Vickrey auctions --…
In many realistic problems of allocating resources, economy efficiency must be taken into consideration together with social equality, and price rigidities are often made according to some economic and social needs. We study the…
Finding the optimal product prices and product assortment are two fundamental problems in revenue management. Usually, a seller needs to jointly determine the prices and assortment while managing a network of resources with limited…
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both the…
With the emergence of new online channels and information technology, digital advertising tends to substitute more and more to traditional advertising by offering the opportunity to companies to target the consumers/users that are really…
Ad exchanges are becoming an increasingly popular way to sell advertisement slots on the internet. An ad exchange is basically a spot market for ad impressions. A publisher who has already signed contracts reserving advertisement…
We study large markets with a single seller which can produce many types of goods, and many multi-minded buyers. The seller chooses posted prices for its many items, and the buyers purchase bundles to maximize their utility. For this…
We consider a fundamental pricing model in which a fixed number of units of a reusable resource are used to serve customers. Customers arrive to the system according to a stochastic process and upon arrival decide whether or not to purchase…
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing {\em sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM)} in $K$-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has $K$ copies of an item to sell, and there are $n$ buyers,…
A monopolist wishes to maximize her profits by finding an optimal price policy. After she announces a menu of products and prices, each agent $x$ will choose to buy that product $y(x)$ which maximizes his own utility, if positive. The…
There are two major ways of selling impressions in display advertising. They are either sold in spot through auction mechanisms or in advance via guaranteed contracts. The former has achieved a significant automation via real-time bidding…