Related papers: Coevolutionary networks of reinforcement-learning …
We extend the study of learning in games to dynamics that exhibit non-asymptotic stability. We do so through the notion of uniform stability, which is concerned with equilibria of individually utility-seeking dynamics. Perhaps surprisingly,…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
We consider payoff-based learning of a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in multi-agent systems. Our focus is on games with jointly convex constraints of a linear structure and strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. We present a convergent…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
In this work, we study the interaction of strategic agents in continuous action Cournot games with limited information feedback. Cournot game is the essential market model for many socio-economic systems where agents learn and compete…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, social interaction could change the relationship of people. And the changing social structure will affect the people's strategy too. We build…
Complex networks are a great tool for simulating the outcomes of different strategies used within the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. However, because the strategies themselves rely on the connection between nodes, then initial network…
In population games, a large population of players, modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how…
We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…
Cooperation is the foundation of ecosystems and the human society, and the reinforcement learning provides crucial insight into the mechanism for its emergence. However, most previous work has mostly focused on the self-organization at the…
We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new…
A fundamental problem in noncooperative dynamic game theory is the computation of Nash equilibria under different information structures, which specify the information available to each agent during decision-making. Prior work has…
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution,…
Here we will use results of Cox, Durrett, and Perkins for voter model perturbations to study spatial evolutionary games on $Z^d$, $d\ge 3$ when the interaction kernel is finite range, symmetric, and has covariance matrix $\sigma^2I$. The…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…