Related papers: An n-ary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Proble…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
We consider equilibrium one-on-one conversations between neighbors on a circular table, with the goal of assessing the likelihood of a (perhaps) familiar situation: sitting at a table where both of your neighbors are talking to someone…
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
We extend the definition of $n$-dimensional difference equations to complex order $\alpha\in \mathbb{C} $. We investigate the stability of linear systems defined by an $n$-dimensional matrix $A$ and derive conditions for the stability of…
Given a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) on $n$ variables, $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n \in \{\pm 1\}$, and $m$ constraints, a global cardinality constraint has the form of $\sum_{i = 1}^{n} x_i = (1-2p)n$, where $p \in (\Omega(1), 1 -…
Let us consider two sequences of closed convex sets $\{A_n\}$ and $\{B_n\}$ converging with respect to the Attouch-Wets convergence to $A$ and $B$, respectively. Given a starting point $a_0$, we consider the sequences of points obtained by…
We investigate the hardness of establishing as many stable marriages (that is, marriages that last forever) in a population whose memory is placed in some arbitrary state with respect to the considered problem, and where traitors try to…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
Many consensus string problems are based on Hamming distance. We replace Hamming distance by the more flexible (e.g., easily coping with different input string lengths) dynamic time warping distance, best known from applications in time…
In this paper, we embark on a captivating exploration of the stabilization of locally transmitted problems within the realm of two interconnected wave systems. To begin, we wield the formidable Arendt-Batty criteria\cite{AW} to affirm the…
We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of Kamada and Kojima on matchings with distributional…
The Weighted Constraint Satisfaction Problem (WCSP) framework allows representing and solving problems involving both hard constraints and cost functions. It has been applied to various problems, including resource allocation,…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
We study the binary perceptron, a random constraint satisfaction problem that asks to find a Boolean vector in the intersection of independently chosen random halfspaces. A striking feature of this model is that at every positive constraint…
The Stable Marriage problem (SM), solved by the famous deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (GS), has many natural generalizations. If we allow ties in preferences, then the problem of finding a maximum stable matching becomes…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…