Related papers: Compiling symbolic attacks to protocol implementat…
Ensuring correctness of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is an extremely challenging task that is in practice often addressed with simulation based testing. Formal specification languages, such as Signal Temporal Logic (STL), are used to…
Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure…
This paper presents a new language called APSL for formally describing protocols to facilitate automated testing. Many real world communication protocols exchange messages whose structures are not trivial, e.g. they may consist of multiple…
Security protocols are building blocks in secure communications. They deploy some security mechanisms to provide certain security services. Security protocols are considered abstract when analyzed, but they can have extra vulnerabilities…
Symbolic execution is a powerful program analysis technique that allows for the systematic exploration of all program paths. Path explosion, where the number of states to track becomes unwieldy, is one of the biggest challenges hindering…
Failure detection protocols---a fundamental building block for crafting fault-tolerant distributed systems---are in many cases described by their authors making use of informal pseudo-codes of their conception. Often these pseudo-codes use…
Mass assignment is one of the most prominent vulnerabilities in RESTful APIs. This vulnerability originates from a misconfiguration in common web frameworks, such that naming convention and automatic binding can be exploited by an attacker…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have performed exceptionally in various text-generative tasks, including question answering, translation, code completion, etc. However, the over-assistance of LLMs has raised the challenge of "jailbreaking",…
We present a novel approach for attacking black-box large language models (LLMs) by exploiting their ability to express confidence in natural language. Existing black-box attacks require either access to continuous model outputs like logits…
Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…
We propose a symbolic execution method for analyzing the safety of software under fault attacks both accurately and efficiently. Fault attacks leverage physically injected hardware faults in an embedded system to break the safety of a…
The recent Spectre attacks has demonstrated the fundamental insecurity of current computer microarchitecture. The attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and speculation to extract arbitrary information about the memory contents…
Spectre vulnerabilities violate our fundamental assumptions about architectural abstractions, allowing attackers to steal sensitive data despite previously state-of-the-art countermeasures. To defend against Spectre, developers of…
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security…
Jailbreaks on large language models (LLMs) have recently received increasing attention. For a comprehensive assessment of LLM safety, it is essential to consider jailbreaks with diverse attributes, such as contextual coherence and…
In concurrent and distributed systems, software components are expected to communicate according to predetermined protocols and APIs - and if a component does not observe them, the system's reliability is compromised. Furthermore, isolating…
We present a new and practical framework for security verification of secure architectures. Specifically, we break the verification task into external verification and internal verification. External verification considers the external…
Jailbreak attacks represent one of the most sophisticated threats to the security of large language models (LLMs). To deal with such risks, we introduce an innovative framework that can help evaluate the effectiveness of jailbreak attacks…