Related papers: Manipulation of Stable Matchings using Minimal Bla…
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of…
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable…
Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). For an instance $I$ of SMI there may be many stable matchings, providing significantly different outcomes for the sets of…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Lying in order to manipulate the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm has been studied by Dubins and Friedman and by Gale and Sotomayor and was shown to be generally more appealing to the proposed-to side (denoted as the women in Gale and…
In the stable marriage problem N men and N women have to be matched by pairs under the constraint that the resulting matching is stable. We study the statistical properties of stable matchings in the large N limit using both numerical and…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
We show that given a SM instance G as input we can find a largest collection of pairwise edge-disjoint stable matchings of G in time linear in the input size. This extends two classical results: 1. The Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can find…