Related papers: Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
This paper studies complexity theoretic aspects of quantum refereed games, which are abstract games between two competing players that send quantum states to a referee, who performs an efficiently implementable joint measurement on the two…
The prophet inequality is one of the cornerstone problems in optimal stopping theory and has become a crucial tool for designing sequential algorithms in Bayesian settings. In the i.i.d. $k$-selection prophet inequality problem, we…
We propose quantum devices that can realize probabilistically different projective measurements on a qubit. The desired measurement basis is selected by the quantum state of a program register. First we analyze the phase-covariant…
We consider a game in which two separate laboratories collaborate to prepare a quantum system and are then asked to guess the outcome of a measurement performed by a third party in a random basis on that system. Intuitively, by the…
Many online problems are studied in stochastic settings for which inputs are samples from a known distribution, given in advance, or from an unknown distribution. Such distributions model both beyond-worst-case inputs and, when given,…
When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…
Most of the literature on online algorithms in revenue management focuses on settings with irrevocable decisions, where once a decision is made upon the arrival of a new input, it cannot be canceled later. Motivated by modern applications…
We establish the first hardness results for the problem of computing the value of one-round games played by a verifier and a team of provers who can share quantum entanglement. In particular, we show that it is NP-hard to approximate within…
The ``impossibility theorem'' -- which is considered foundational in algorithmic fairness literature -- asserts that there must be trade-offs between common notions of fairness and performance when fitting statistical models, except in two…
We study a modification of the so-called Parrondo's paradox where a large number of individuals choose the game they want to play by voting. We show that it can be better for the players to vote randomly than to vote according to their own…
Bayesian persuasion is a model for understanding strategic information revelation: an agent with an informational advantage, called a sender, strategically discloses information by sending signals to another agent, called a receiver. In…
A gambler walks into a hypothetical fair casino with a very real dollar bill, but by the time he leaves he's exchanged the dollar for a random amount of money. What is lost in the process? It may be that the gambler walks out at the end of…
We consider the problem of selecting sequentially a unimodal subsequence from a sequence of independent identically distributed random variables, and we find that a person doing optimal sequential selection does within a factor of the…
In a biased weak $(a,b)$ polyform achievement game, the maker and the breaker alternately mark $a,b$ previously unmarked cells on an infinite board, respectively. The maker's goal is to mark a set of cells congruent to a polyform. The…
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
Social networks are increasingly being used to conduct polls. We introduce a simple model of such social polling. We suppose agents vote sequentially, but the order in which agents choose to vote is not necessarily fixed. We also suppose…
Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
Let G be a semisimple Lie group without compact factors, \Gamma be an irreducible lattice in G. In the first part of the article we give the necessary and sufficient condition under which a sequence of translates of probability…
Parrondo's paradox arises in sequences of games in which a winning expectation may be obtained by playing the games in a random order, even though each game in the sequence may be lost when played individually. We present a suitable version…