Related papers: On the diffuseness of incomplete information game

In this paper we introduce the inaccessible game, an information-theoretic dynamical system constructed from four axioms. The first three axioms are known and define \emph{information loss} in the system. The fourth is a novel…

In timeline-based planning, domains are described as sets of independent, but interacting, components, whose behaviour over time (the set of timelines) is governed by a set of temporal constraints. A distinguishing feature of timeline-based…

This paper introduces a novel criterion, persuasiveness, to select equilibria in signaling games. In response to the Stiglitz critique, persuasiveness focuses on the comparison across equilibria. An equilibrium is more persuasive than an…

Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…

Through a stochastic control theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the…

Differential games with asymmetric information were introduced by Cardaliaguet (2007). As in repeated games with lack of information on both sides (Aumann and Maschler (1995)), each player receives a private signal (his type) before the…

We consider a two-player zero-sum game with integral payoff and with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff is chosen among a continuous set of possible payoffs. We prove that the value function of this game is solution of an…

We investigate newsvendor games whose payoff function is uncertain due to ambiguity in demand distributions. We discuss the concept of stability under uncertainty and introduce solution concepts for robust cooperative games which could be…

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash…

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player's information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…

We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…

In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…

This paper studies n-player games where players beliefs about their opponents behaviour are capacities (fuzzy measures, non-additive probabilities). The concept of an equilibrium under uncertainty was introduced by J.Dow and S.Werlang…