Related papers: Slot Games for Detecting Timing Leaks of Programs
Leaking information about the execution behavior of critical real-time tasks may lead to serious consequences, including violations of temporal constraints and even severe failures. We study information leakage for a special class of…
Timing side-channel attacks exploit secret-dependent execution time to fully or partially recover secrets of cryptographic implementations, posing a severe threat to software security. Constant-time programming discipline is an effective…
Quantitative verification techniques have been developed for the formal analysis of a variety of probabilistic models, such as Markov chains, Markov decision process and their variants. They can be used to produce guarantees on quantitative…
Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on systems security. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage occurs whenever an attacker successfully deduces confidential internal information. In this work, we…
We present a novel formal system for proving quantitative-leakage properties of programs. Based on a theory of Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) that models information leakage as a noisy communication channel, it uses "gain-functions"…
This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…
Program analysis is a technique to reason about programs without executing them, and it has various applications in compilers, integrated development environments, and security. In this work, we present a machine learning pipeline that…
Speculative execution attacks undermine the security of constant-time programming, the standard technique used to prevent microarchitectural side channels in security-sensitive software such as cryptographic code. Constant-time code must…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
Attacks like Spectre abuse speculative execution, one of the key performance optimizations of modern CPUs. Recently, several testing tools have emerged to automatically detect speculative leaks in commercial (black-box) CPUs. However, the…
We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…
The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…
Information flow analysis prevents secret or untrusted data from flowing into public or trusted sinks. Existing mechanisms cover a wide array of options, ranging from lightweight taint analysis to heavyweight information flow control that…
Timing information leakage occurs whenever an attacker successfully deduces confidential internal information by observing some timed information such as events with timestamps. Timed automata are an extension of finite-state automata with…
We use Hidden Markov Models to motivate a quantitative compositional semantics for noninterference-based security with iteration, including a refinement- or "implements" relation that compares two programs with respect to their information…
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…
Machine learning models are increasingly used for software security tasks. These models are commonly trained and evaluated on large Internet-derived datasets, which often contain duplicated or highly similar samples. When such samples are…