Related papers: Network Formation Games with Heterogeneous Players…

We study the Nash equilibrium and the price of anarchy in the max-distance network creation game. Network creation game, first introduced and studied by Fabrikant et al., is a classic model for real-world networks from a game-theoretic…

We study the interplay between evolutionary game and network structure and show how the dynamics of the game affect the growth pattern of the network and how the evolution of the network influence the cooperative behavior in the game.…

This paper studies controlling segregation in social networks via exogenous incentives. We construct an edge formation game on a directed graph. A user (node) chooses the probability with which it forms an inter- or intra- community edge…

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…

The Internet topology at the Autonomous Systems level (AS graph) has a power--law degree distribution and a tier structure. In this paper, we introduce the Interactive Growth (IG) model based on the joint growth of new nodes and new links.…

Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote…

Inspired by the structure of technological networks, we discuss network evolution mechanisms which give rise to topological properties found in real spatial networks. Thus, the peculiar structure of transport and distribution networks is…

The structure and dynamic of social network are largely determined by the heterogeneous interaction activity and social capital allocation of individuals. These features interplay in a non-trivial way in the formation of network and…

Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central…

We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the…

This paper considers a network formation model when links are potentially misclassified. We focus on a game-theoretical model of strategic network formation with incomplete information, in which the linking decisions depend on agents'…

In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of…

We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution,…

We introduce a class of strategic games in which agents are assigned to nodes of a topology graph and the utility of an agent depends on both the agent's inherent utilities for other agents as well as her distance from these agents on the…

As a step towards studying human-agent collectives we conduct an online game with human participants cooperating on a network. The game is presented in the context of achieving group formation through local coordination. The players set…

Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…

Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…

We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…

We analyze ways by which people decompose into groups in distributed systems. We are interested in systems in which an agent can increase its utility by connecting to other agents, but must also pay a cost that increases with the size of…

The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…