Related papers: Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
We consider the online stochastic matching problem for bipartite graphs where edges adjacent to an online node must be probed to determine if they exist, based on known edge probabilities. Our algorithms respect commitment, in that if a…
We investigate the role of commitment in optimal stopping by studying all the variants between Prophet Inequality (PI) and Pandora's Box (PB). Both problems deal with a set of variables drawn from known distributions. In PI the gambler…
We study generalizations of the "Prophet Inequality" and "Secretary Problem", where the algorithm is restricted to an arbitrary downward-closed set system. For {0,1}-values, we give O(log n)-competitive algorithms for both problems. This is…
We consider the matroid prophet inequality problem. This problem has been extensively studied in the case of adaptive mechanisms. In particular, there is a tight $2$-competitive mechanism for all matroids. However, it is not known what…
Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the…
We introduce a novel framework of Prophet Inequalities for combinatorial valuation functions. For a (non-monotone) submodular objective function over an arbitrary matroid feasibility constraint, we give an $O(1)$-competitive algorithm. For…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…
We provide prophet inequality algorithms for online weighted matching in general (non-bipartite) graphs, under two well-studied arrival models, namely edge arrival and vertex arrival. The weight of each edge is drawn independently from an…
We revisit three fundamental problems in algorithms under uncertainty: the Secretary Problem, Prophet Inequality, and Stochastic Probing, each subject to general downward-closed constraints. When elements have binary values, all three…
We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time $t$, an online…
We consider online variations of the Pandora's box problem (Weitzman. 1979), a standard model for understanding issues related to the cost of acquiring information for decision-making. Our problem generalizes both the classic Pandora's box…
We study the problem of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible goods to $n$ agents, where agents may have different preferences over the goods. In the traditional setting, agents' valuations are provided as inputs to the algorithm. In this…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible…
Let $X_n,...,X_1$ be i.i.d. random variables with distribution function $F$. A statistician, knowing $F$, observes the $X$ values sequentially and is given two chances to choose $X$'s using stopping rules. The statistician's goal is to stop…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…
In this paper, we investigate the optimal strategies in the Werewolf Game-a widely played strategic social deduction game involving two opposing factions-from a game-theoretic perspective. We consider two scenarios: the game without a…
Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) were proposed by Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen as a generic technique to round a fractional solution in the matroid polytope in an online fashion. It has found applications in several…