Related papers: Cyclic motions in Dekel-Scotchmer Game Experiments
In mixed strategy 2\times2 population games, the realization of maximum entropy (Maxent) is of the theoretical expectation. We evaluate this theoretical prediction in the experimental economics game data. The data includes 12 treatments and…
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than $\epsilon$ by…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
A game-theoretic framework for time-inconsistent stopping problems where the time-inconsistency is due to the consideration of a non-linear function of an expected reward is developed. A class of mixed strategy stopping times that allows…
Since their introduction, anchoring methods in extragradient-type saddlepoint problems have inspired a flurry of research due to their ability to provide order-optimal rates of accelerated convergence in very general problem settings. Such…
We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
Cyclic (rock-paper-scissors-type) population models serve to mimic complex species interactions. Focusing on a paradigmatic three-species model with mutations in one dimension, we observe an interplay between equilibrium and non-equilibrium…
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon>0$. Their proof…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
We revisit the original hawk-dove game with slight modifications to payoff values while maintaining the fundamental principles of interaction. The practical robustness of the theoretical tools of game theory is tested on a simulated…
Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the…
By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in…
The well-known game of Rock--Paper--Scissors can be used as a simple model of competition between three species. When modelled in continuous time using differential equations, the resulting system contains a heteroclinic cycle between the…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Population dynamics in systems composed of cyclically competing species has been of increasing interest recently. Here, we investigate a system with four or more species. Using mean field theory, we study in detail the trajectories in…
We consider coalition formation among players in an n-player finite strategic game over infinite horizon. At each time a randomly formed coalition makes a joint deviation from a current action profile such that at new action profile all…