Related papers: On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Fo…
A resource exchange network is considered, where exchanges among nodes are based on reciprocity. Peers receive from the network an amount of resources commensurate with their contribution. We assume the network is fully connected, and…
We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…
In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design…
Dynamic networks are graphs in which edges are available only at specific time instants, modeling connections that change over time. The dynamic network creation game studies this setting as a strategic interaction where each vertex…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…
Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…
In this work, we investigate an application of a Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm in a social network. In a networked game each player (user) takes action in response to other players' actions in order to decrease (increase) his cost…
We initiate the study of the \emph{destruction model} (\aka \emph{adversary model}) introduced by Kliemann (2010), using the stability concept of \emph{swap equilibrium} introduced by Alon et. al (2010). The destruction model is a network…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…
We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows. In an effort to decouple the effect of risk-averse player…
In signed networks, each edge is labeled as either positive or negative. The edge sign captures the polarity of a relationship. Balance of signed networks is a well-studied property in graph theory. In a balanced (sub)graph, the vertices…
We study a network formation game where $n$ players, identified with the nodes of a directed graph to be formed, choose where to wire their outgoing links in order to maximize their PageRank centrality. Specifically, the action of every…
Network Design problems typically ask for a minimum cost sub-network from a given host network. This classical point-of-view assumes a central authority enforcing the optimum solution. But how should networks be designed to cope with…
We investigate some of the properties and extensions of a dynamic innovation network model recently introduced in \citep{koenig07:_effic_stabil_dynam_innov_networ}. In the model, the set of efficient graphs ranges, depending on the cost for…
We propose a model of network formation based on reinforcement learning, which can be seen as a generalization as the one proposed by Skyrms for signaling games. On a discrete graph, whose vertices represent individuals, at any time step…
We model the formation of networks as a game where players aspire to maximize their own centrality by increasing the number of other players to which they are path-wise connected, while simultaneously incurring a cost for each added…
The price of anarchy has become a standard measure of the efficiency of equilibria in games. Most of the literature in this area has focused on establishing worst-case bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more…