Related papers: Analyzing Incentives for Protocol Compliance in Co…
The design of safety-critical agents based on large language models (LLMs) requires more than simple prompt engineering. This paper presents a comprehensive information-theoretic analysis of how rule encodings in system prompts influence…
We use an evolutionary game model to study the interplay between corporate environmental compliance and enforcement promoted by the policy maker in a country facing a pollution trap, i.e., a scenario in which the vast majority of firms do…
Agents rarely act in isolation -- their behavioral history, in particular, is public to others. We seek a non-asymptotic understanding of how a leader agent should shape this history to its maximal advantage, knowing that follower agent(s)…
A large body of research is currently investigating on the connection between machine learning and game theory. In this work, game theory notions are injected into a preference learning framework. Specifically, a preference learning problem…
Serious crime modelling typically needs to be undertaken securely behind a firewall where police knowledge and capabilities can remain undisclosed. Data informing an ongoing incident is often sparse, with a large proportion of relevant data…
Game-based interactive driving simulations have emerged as versatile platforms for advancing decision-making algorithms in road transport mobility. While these environments offer safe, scalable, and engaging settings for testing driving…
Securing dynamic networks against adversarial actions is challenging because of the need to anticipate and counter strategic disruptions by adversarial entities within complex network structures. Traditional game-theoretic models, while…
We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…
Coding theory plays a crucial role in ensuring data integrity and reliability across various domains, from communication to computation and storage systems. However, its reliance on trust assumptions for data recovery, which requires the…
We study automated security response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed, non-stationary game. We relax the standard assumption that the game model is correctly…
This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…
Off-chain protocols constitute one of the most promising approaches to solve the inherent scalability issue of blockchain technologies. The core idea is to let parties transact on-chain only once to establish a channel between them,…
Modeling and analyzing security of networked systems is an important problem in the emerging Science of Security and has been under active investigation. In this paper, we propose a new approach towards tackling the problem. Our approach is…
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
We construct a model of strategic imitation in an arbitrary network of players who interact through an additive game. Assuming a discrete time update, we show a condition under which the resulting difference equations converge to consensus.…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We present a strategic analysis of a trust model that has recently been proposed for promoting cooperative behaviour in user-centric networks. The mechanism for cooperation is based on a combination of reputation and virtual currency…
As large language models (LLMs) grow more capable, concerns about their safe deployment have also grown. Although alignment mechanisms have been introduced to deter misuse, they remain vulnerable to carefully designed adversarial prompts.…