Related papers: Inertial game dynamics and applications to constra…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
We use ideas from distributed computing to study dynamic environments in which computational nodes, or decision makers, follow adaptive heuristics (Hart 2005), i.e., simple and unsophisticated rules of behavior, e.g., repeatedly "best…
We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…
We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
A further generalization of the stochastic replicator dynamic derived by Fudenberg and Harris \cite{FH92} is considered. In particular, a Poissonian integral is introduced to the fitness to simulate the affects of anomalous events. For the…
Selection in a time-periodic environment is modeled via the two-player replicator dynamics. For sufficiently fast environmental changes, this is reduced to a multi-player replicator dynamics in a constant environment. The two-player terms…
Congestion games are attractive because they can model many concrete situations where some competing entities interact through the use of some shared resources, and also because they always admit pure Nash equilibria which correspond to the…
Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…
Robots in dynamic environments need fast, accurate models of how objects move in their environments to support agile planning. In sports such as ping pong, analytical models often struggle to accurately predict ball trajectories with spins…
We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…
This paper extends the optimal-trading framework developed in arXiv:2409.03586v1 to compute optimal strategies with real-world constraints. The aim of the current paper, as with the previous, is to study trading in the context of…
A new class of projected dynamical systems of third order is investigated for quasi (parametric) variational inequalities in which the convex set in the classical variational inequality also depends upon the solution explicitly or…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…
We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal multiple access channels by considering a continuous non-cooperative game whose strategy space represents the users' distribution of transmission power over the network's…
This paper combines ideas from Q-learning and fictitious play to define three reinforcement learning procedures which converge to the set of stationary mixed Nash equilibria in identical interest discounted stochastic games. First, we…
In this paper, we consider stochastic monotone Nash games where each player's strategy set is characterized by possibly a large number of explicit convex constraint inequalities. Notably, the functional constraints of each player may depend…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
We consider variational Mean Field Games endowed with a constraint on the maximal density of the distribution of players. Minimizers of the variational formulation are equilibria for a game where both the running cost and the final cost of…
First order kinetic mean field games formally describe the Nash equilibria of deterministic differential games where agents control their acceleration, asymptotically in the limit as the number of agents tends to infinity. The known results…