Related papers: Inertial game dynamics and applications to constra…
We consider a class of nonsmooth aggregative games over networks in stochastic regimes, where each player is characterized by a composite cost function $f_i+r_i$, $f_i$ is a smooth expectation-valued function dependent on its own strategy…
Min-max optimization problems arise in several key machine learning setups, including adversarial learning and generative modeling. In their general form, in absence of convexity/concavity assumptions, finding pure equilibria of the…
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the…
We introduce and study a mean-field model for a system of spatially distributed players interacting through an evolutionary game driven by a replicator dynamics. Strategies evolve by a replicator dynamics influenced by the position and the…
We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, $N$…
Reinforcement-based learning dynamics may exhibit several limitations when applied in a distributed setup. In (repeatedly-played) multi-player/action strategic-form games, and when each player applies an independent copy of the learning…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…
This paper studies a meta-simplex concept and geometric embedding framework for multi-population replicator dynamics. Central results are two embedding theorems which constitute a formal reduction of multi-population replicator dynamics to…
Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…
We study a class of distributionally robust games where agents are allowed to heterogeneously choose their risk aversion with respect to distributional shifts of the uncertainty. In our formulation, heterogeneous Wasserstein ball…
In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…
We examine a wide class of stochastic approximation algorithms for solving (stochastic) nonlinear problems on Riemannian manifolds. Such algorithms arise naturally in the study of Riemannian optimization, game theory and optimal transport,…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
In this note we study a new class of alignment models with self-propulsion and Rayleigh-type friction forces, which describes the collective behavior of agents with individual characteristic parameters. We describe the long time dynamics…
We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…
We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…
Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow…
This paper presents a model of network formation in repeated games where the players adapt their strategies and network ties simultaneously using a simple reinforcement-learning scheme. It is demonstrated that the coevolutionary dynamics of…