Related papers: On Discrete Preferences and Coordination
Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by…
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…
Consider a system in which players at nodes of an underlying graph G repeatedly play Prisoner's Dilemma against their neighbors. The players adapt their strategies based on the past behavior of their opponents by applying the so-called…
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs. In such a game, players correspond to vertices in a graph and face a binary choice of performing an action, or not. Each player's decision…
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of providing a bipartite matching between n " boys " and n " girls "-each of whom have a totally ordered preference list over the other set-such that there exists no…
We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…
We analyze the game of go from the point of view of complex networks. We construct three different directed networks of increasing complexity, defining nodes as local patterns on plaquettes of increasing sizes, and links as actual…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…
Nearly all simulation-based games have environment parameters that affect incentives in the interaction but are not explicitly incorporated into the game model. To understand the impact of these parameters on strategic incentives, typical…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoner's…
Decision making in modern large-scale and complex systems such as communication networks, smart electricity grids, and cyber-physical systems motivate novel game-theoretic approaches. This paper investigates big strategic (non-cooperative)…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…
The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are…
We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and…