Related papers: Relation-algebraic and Tool-supported Control of C…
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational complexity of manipulating common voting rules. Because of…
In this paper, we generalize the chance optimization problems and introduce constrained volume optimization where enables us to obtain convex formulation for challenging problems in systems and control. We show that many different problems…
Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0)…
Safety-critical systems use redundant input units to improve their reliability and fault tolerance. A voting logic is then used to select a reliable input from the redundant sources. A fault detection and isolation rules help in selecting…
We study a generalization of the voter model on complex networks, focusing on the scaling of mean exit time. Previous work has defined the voter model in terms of an initially chosen node and a randomly chosen neighbor, which makes it…
This paper provides a framework for deriving a new set of necessary conditions for adverse control problems among two players. The distinguish feature of such problems is that the first player has a priori knowledge on the second player…
A decade ago, a beautiful paper by Wagner developed a ``toolkit'' that in certain cases allows one to prove problems hard for parallel access to NP. However, the problems his toolkit applies to most directly are not overly natural. During…
When making simultaneous decisions, our preference for the outcomes on one subset can depend on the outcomes on a disjoint subset. In referendum elections, this gives rise to the separability problem, where a voter must predict the outcome…
Our goal is to define an algebraic language for reasoning about non-deterministic computations. Towards this goal, we introduce an algebra of string-to-string transductions. Specifically, it is an algebra of partial functions on words over…
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where…
In Approval-Based Committee (ABC) voting, each voter lists the candidates they approve and then a voting rule aggregates the individual approvals into a committee that represents the collective choice of the voters. An extensively studied…
Human cognition excels at symbolic reasoning, deducing abstract rules from limited samples. This has been explained using symbolic and connectionist approaches, inspiring the development of a neuro-symbolic architecture that combines both…
We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding…
We consider particle systems that are perturbations of the voter model and show that when space and time are rescaled the system converges to a solution of a reaction diffusion equation in dimensions $d \ge 3$. Combining this result with…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
The Schulze voting method aggregates voter preference data using maxmin-weight graph paths, achieving the Condorcet property that a candidate who would win every head-to-head contest will also win the overall election. Once the voter…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of $m$ alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard implies that there…
Stochastic Model Predictive Control addresses uncertainties by incorporating chance constraints that provide probabilistic guarantees of constraint satisfaction. However, simultaneously optimizing over the risk allocation and the feedback…
Preference aggregation in a multiagent setting is a central issue in both human and computer contexts. In this paper, we study in terms of complexity the vulnerability of preference aggregation to destructive control. That is, we study the…
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever…