Related papers: On the Masami Yasuda stopping game

A theory of existence and uniqueness is developed for general stochastic differential mean field games with common noise. The concepts of strong and weak solutions are introduced in analogy with the theory of stochastic differential…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

In this paper, we present a family of a control-stopping games which arise naturally in equilibrium-based models of market microstructure, as well as in other models with strategic buyers and sellers. A distinctive feature of this family of…

A solution concept that is a refinement of Nash equilibria selects for each finite game a nonempty collection of closed and connected subsets of Nash equilibria as solutions. We impose three axioms for such solution concepts. The axiom of…

This thesis is going to give a gentle introduction to Mean Field Games. It aims to produce a coherent text beginning for simple notions of deterministic control theory progressively to current Mean Field Games theory. The framework…

We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…

Following the ideas laid out in Myerson (1996), Hofbauer (2000) defined a Nash equilibrium of a finite game as sustainable if it can be made the unique Nash equilibrium of a game obtained by deleting/adding a subset of the strategies that…

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…

Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff,…

We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…

We obtain a verification theorem for solving a Dynkin game driven by a L\'evy process. The result requires finding two averaging functions that, composed respectively with the supremum and the infimum of the process, summed, and taked the…

This paper considers the discounted criterion of nonzero-sum decentralized stochastic games with prospect players. The state and action spaces are finite. The state transition probability is nonstationary. Each player independently controls…

We study a nonlinear system of partial differential equations arising in macroeconomics which utilizes a mean field approximation. This system together with the corresponding data, subject to two moment constraints, is a model for debt and…

In this paper, $2\times2$ zero-sum games are studied under the following assumptions: $(1)$ One of the players (the leader) commits to choose its actions by sampling a given probability measure (strategy); $(2)$ The leader announces its…

The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…

The objective of this paper is to analyze the existence of equilibria for a class of deterministic mean field games of controls. The interaction between players is due to both a congestion term and a price function which depends on the…

The main goal of this paper is to study a stochastic game connected to a system of forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) involving delay and so-called noisy memory. We derive suffcient and necessary maximum principles…

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium…

In this paper we consider extended stationary mean field games, that is mean-field games which depend on the velocity field of the players. We prove various a-priori estimates which generalize the results for quasi-variational mean field…

The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…