Related papers: Auction Algorithm for Production Models
Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types…
We consider the optimization problem of a multi-resource, multi-unit VCG auction that produces an optimal, i.e., non-approximated, social welfare. We present an algorithm that solves this optimization problem with pseudo-polynomial…
Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on…
The computation of equilibrium prices at which the supply of goods matches their demand typically relies on complete information on agents' private attributes, e.g., suppliers' cost functions, which are often unavailable in practice.…
The emerging edge computing paradigm promises to deliver superior user experience and enable a wide range of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. In this work, we propose a new market-based framework for efficiently allocating resources…
Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. Price differences might occur due to various reasons such as shipping costs, trade restrictions and price discrimination. To model such…
We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder's valuations, the bidder's ex ante expected surplus, and the…
Many sequential decision-making tasks require satisfaction of multiple, partially contradictory objectives. Existing approaches are monolithic, namely all objectives are fulfilled using a single policy, which is a function that selects a…
Auction data often contain information on only the most competitive bids as opposed to all bids. The usual measurement error approaches to unobserved heterogeneity are inapplicable due to dependence among order statistics. We bridge this…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
We present an algorithm for computing pure-strategy epsilon-perfect Bayesian equilibria in sequential auctions with continuous action and value spaces. Importantly, our algorithm includes a verification phase that computes an upper bound on…
Optimal transportation theory is an area of mathematics with real-world applications in fields ranging from economics to optimal control to machine learning. We propose a new algorithm for solving discrete transport (network flow) problems,…
Sponsored search is an important monetization channel for search engines, in which an auction mechanism is used to select the ads shown to users and determine the prices charged from advertisers. There have been several pieces of work in…
It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly…
Motivated by the dynamic assortment offerings and item pricings occurring in e-commerce, we study a general problem of allocating finite inventories to heterogeneous customers arriving sequentially. We analyze this problem under the…
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and…
We show that a competitive equilibrium always exists in combinatorial auctions with anonymous graphical valuations and pricing, using discrete geometry. This is an intuitive and easy-to-construct class of valuations that can model both…
Auctions play an important role in electronic commerce, and have been used to solve problems in distributed computing. Automated approaches to designing effective auction mechanisms are helpful in reducing the burden of traditional game…
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…
We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that…