Related papers: Auction Algorithm for Production Models
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…
In this paper a new mathematical model is proposed for task scheduling and resource allocation in Grid systems. In this novel model, load balancing, starvation prevention and failing strategies are stated as the constraints and the solution…
We consider the problem of finding a low-cost allocation and ordering of tasks between a team of robots in a d-dimensional, uncertain, landscape, and the sensitivity of this solution to changes in the cost function. Various algorithms have…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions…
We introduce draft auctions, which is a sequential auction format where at each iteration players bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. We show that draft auctions offer an exponential improvement in social welfare at equilibrium…
We present an improved combinatorial algorithm for the computation of equilibrium prices in the linear Arrow-Debreu model. For a market with $n$ agents and integral utilities bounded by $U$, the algorithm runs in $O(n^7 \log^3 (nU))$ time.…
This work presents a descending-price-auction algorithm to obtain the maximum market-clearing price vector (MCP) in unit-demand matching markets with m items by exploiting the combinatorial structure. With a shrewd choice of goods for which…
In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the…
We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction framework for local energy flexibility markets, which addresses the issue of prosumers' inability to bundle multiple flexibility time intervals. To solve the underlying NP-complete winner…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
We cast the problem of combinatorial auction design in a Bayesian framework in order to incorporate prior information into the auction process and minimize the number of rounds to convergence. We first develop a generative model of agent…
We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
We study an off-policy contextual pricing problem where the seller has access to samples of prices that customers were previously offered, whether they purchased at that price, and auxiliary features describing the customer and/or item…
In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of impressive results, the performance of most posted price mechanisms however, rely…