Related papers: On the Jeffreys-Lindley's paradox

Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is a case where frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing methodologies contradict with each other. This has caused confusion among data analysts for selecting a methodology for their statistical inference tasks.…

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian…

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox stands as the most profound divergence between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing. Yet despite more than six decades of discussion, this paradox remains frequently misunderstood--even in…

This paper is concerned with the well known Jeffreys-Lindley paradox. In a Bayesian set up, the so-called paradox arises when a point null hypothesis is tested and an objective prior is sought for the alternative hypothesis. In particular,…

In 1957, Lindley published "A statistical paradox" in Biometrika, revealing a fundamental conflict between frequentist and Bayesian inference as sample size approaches infinity. We present a new paradox of a different kind: a conflict…

The so-called Lindley paradox is a counterintuitive statistical effect where the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to hypothesis testing give radically different answers, depending on the choice of the prior distribution. In this paper we…

The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox displays how the use of a p-value (or number of standard deviations z) in a frequentist hypothesis test can lead to an inference that is radically different from that of a Bayesian hypothesis test in the form…

We consider the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox from an objective Bayesian perspective by attempting to find priors representing complete indifference to sample size in the problem. This means that we ensure that the prior for the unknown mean and…

There are three principle paradigms of statistics: Bayesian, frequentist and information-based inference. Although these paradigms are in agreement in some contexts, the Lindley paradox describes a class of problems, models of unknown…

In the hypothesis testing framework, p-value is often computed to determine rejection of the null hypothesis or not. On the other hand, Bayesian approaches typically compute the posterior probability of the null hypothesis to evaluate its…

We introduce a new class of priors for Bayesian hypothesis testing, which we name "cake priors". These priors circumvent Bartlett's paradox (also called the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox); the problem associated with the use of diffuse priors…

In many common situations, a Bayesian credible interval will be, given the same data, very similar to a frequentist confidence interval, and researchers will interpret these intervals in a similar fashion. However, no predictable similarity…

It has long been known that for the comparison of pairwise nested models, a decision based on the Bayes factor produces a consistent model selector (in the frequentist sense). Here we go beyond the usual consistency for nested pairwise…

The marginalization paradox involves a disagreement between two Bayesians who use two different procedures for calculating a posterior in the presence of an improper prior. We show that the argument used to justify the procedure of one of…

Recently, several researchers have claimed that conclusions obtained from a Bayes factor (or the posterior odds) may contradict those obtained from Bayesian posterior estimation. In this short paper, we wish to point out that no such…

Estimating the difference between two binomial proportions will be investigated, where Bayesian, frequentist and fiducial (BFF) methods will be considered. Three vague priors will be used, the Jeffreys prior, a divergence prior and the…

We consider a novel paradigm for Bayesian testing of hypotheses and Bayesian model comparison. Our alternative to the traditional construction of posterior probabilities that a given hypothesis is true or that the data originates from a…

A central challenge in statistical inference is the presence of confounding variables that may distort observed associations between treatment and outcome. Conventional "causal" methods, grounded in assumptions such as ignorability, exclude…

I review the problem of the choice of the priors from the point of view of a physicist interested in measuring a physical quantity, and I try to show that the reference priors often recommended for the purpose (Jeffreys priors) do not fit…

Testing the equality of two proportions is a common procedure in science, especially in medicine and public health. In these domains it is crucial to be able to quantify evidence for the absence of a treatment effect. Bayesian hypothesis…